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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL BINKS, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20160235-SC 
REPLACEMENT REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
**** 
ARGUMENT 
(i@ I. THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE POLICE TO STOP AND 
SEARCH BINKS 
Every argument in the first section of the State's brief depends upon one 
premise, that this Court will conclude Binks was covered within the scope of the 
warrant because he was at the location at a time that was "substantially 
contemporaneous to the execution of the warrant". State's Replacement Brief at 
19. Because the facts found by the trial court are clear and the State has no hope 
in challenging those facts, the State needs this Court to conclude that the warrant 
~ language "at the time of warrant service" and "during the time of warrant service" 
can reasonably be interpreted to include the minutes preceding warrant service, 
to expand the authorization of the warrant beyond its own language. Section A1 
of the State's brief addresses this question directly and argues that the police can 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reasonably search and seize beyond the limits of the language because "people 
like Binks" were who the warrant would have been directed towards. State's 
Replacement Brief at 17. Then, section A2 presumes Binks was covered by the 
warrant, and argues Bailey does not apply because it dealt with a case where the 
defendant was not covered by the warrant. Section A3 again presumes it, and 
argues the other cases cited in Binks' replacement brief are not persuasive 
because those defendants were not specifically covered by the warrant. Each of 
these arguments depends upon the legal conclusion that the warrant, interpreted 
in a common sense way, authorized the police to detain and search Binks because 
he was at the location before the warrant was executed. 
Conversely, each of Binks' arguments depends upon the opposite point, 
that this Court will find the warrant did not authorize the police to detain and 
search Binks because he was not "at the location or attempting to leave the 
location at the time of the warrant service". R.912, State's Exhibit 4. Binks' claims ~ 
depend upon this Court concluding it would not be reasonable for the police to 
interpret the language of the warrant to authorize searches or seizures of people 
or vehicles which were not at the location or attempting to leave the location "at 
the time" or "during the time of warrant service." R.912, Exhibit 4. Regardless of 
the fact that people like Binks were the kinds of people the police would want to 4t;; 
search and seize, the warrant did not mention Binks, and when it particularly 
described the people who the police were allowed to search, people like Binks, 
people not at the location or attempting to leave, were not among them. 
2 
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A. The officers' detention and search of Binks was not authorized by the 
search warrant 
The State's argument depends upon this Court creating a new exception to 
the particularity requirement under the Fourth Amendment. According to the 
State, even though warrants shall not issue unless they "particularly describ[e] 
the place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized", if the persons or 
(,j places are not particularly described, but instead substantially described, then no 
harm done. UNITED STATES CONST., AMEND. IV. What the State wants this Court to 
do is conclude that when timing is part of the particulars explicitly describing 
who can be searched in the warrant, that timing language need only be 
"substantially" followed. The Court should not make this new exception. 
1. Binks and his SUV were not subject to search under the express 
terms of the warrant 
The State recognizes that officers executing a search warrant "must 
~ interpret a warrant's terms reasonably", but argues that, because a reasonable 
interpretation 1s not necessarily the "narrowest possible reasonable 
interpretation", the police were reasonable in this case when they interpreted the 
warrant more broadly than the language used in the warrant. State's 
Replacement Brief at 18-19 (quoting United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940 (7th 
Cir. 2010). According to the State, the police would have been reasonable to 
interpret the language "any other person at the location or attempting to leave the 
location at the time of warrant service" to also include 'any person who left the 
location prior to the time of the warrant service.' Binks does not find this 
3 
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interpretation reasonable or common sense at all. 
The State claims that requiring the police to read the language of the (i;) 
warrant for what it actually says would be to require a hypertechnical reading of 
the warrant, unnecessary under the Fourth Amendment. See State's Replacement 
Brief at 18. According to the State, it would be unreasonable to expect the police 
to understand the terms "at the time" and "during the time" to actually mean 
something about the timing of the execution of the warrant. This is nonsense. 
Any reasonable person would plainly understand these terms acted as a limit 
upon who the warrant authorized for search, depending upon when the warrant 
was executed. There is nothing confusing or hypertechnical about it. 
It is helpful to discuss this idea of hypertechnical or overly narrow readings 
in order to show that it would not apply in this case. For example, the State cites, 
without analysis, to United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272 (9th Cir. 1996). 
There, the defendant challenged the discovery of weapons, bullets, and explosives 
found in a container outside his home (a bus) where the warrant only explicitly 
authorized search of the bus/residence. The trial court granted a motion to 
suppress finding the container was on the bus/residence's curtilage, and that "the 
warrant on its face authorized a search of only the bus", not its curtilage. 
Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 274. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court concluding 
that to separate curtilage is "considered part of the home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes" and therefore, a warrant that authorized search of the 
home included authorization to search the curtilage. Gorman, 274 (citing Oliver 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v. United State, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, So L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). "The 
(4@ search of the curtilage in this case was authorized because it was inseparable for 
privacy purposes from the bus-residence identified in the warrant." Gorman, 275. 
According to the Ninth Circuit, to conclude that the police should have made a 
distinction between the bus/residence and the grounds immediately surrounding 
it would have been hypertechnical and not required by the Fourth Amendment. 
~ 
Unlike the warrant interpretation in Gorman, where the court found that 
the same privacy interests related a home apply equally to the inside of the home 
and its curtilage, there is no legal precedent to consider a person who was 
recently in a home the same as a person is currently in a home, for privacy 
reasons. According to the Supreme Court in Oliver, the legal justification for 
overcoming a person's expectation of privacy in their home applies equally to the 
area immediately surrounding the home. See Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (curtilage 
"considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."). No such 
legal justification applies in this case. Courts have not found that a warrant 
authorizing the search of a home and anyone in it also authorizes the search of 
anyone who had been in the home in the past. 
The State claims "the search warrant could reasonably be interpreted as 
~ including people like Binks" but does not explain what is reasonable about the 
change. What is reasonable about the police changing an explicit limitation in the 
warrant? It is not like Gorman where the warrant's silence on curtilage is 
reasonably inferred to mean the yard could be searched by authorization to 
5 
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search the home. The warrant's silence in this case on the issue of persons who 
were not at the location when the warrant was served cannot be inferred from the 
circumstances. There is nothing reasonable, there was no good reason, for the 
police to conclude they could stop and search Binks based on a common sense 
reading of the language of the warrant. 
The State's argument requires the court to consider "the circumstances 
and ... the nature of the property [or person] to be seized." Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 
209. And the State's argument depends upon the Court finding that the 
circumstances suggest that any discrepancies between the specific authorization 
and what the police actually searched or seized is insignificant. 
But the argument fails because this Court should not find these 
discrepancies to be insignificant. And reference to relevant cases demonstrates 
why. In Atkin the "police obtained a search warrant authorizing them to search 
Atkin's residence" which was described by the street address, noting that the 
"apartment of interest is in the basement" and describing the side door on the 
main floor that led to the apartment. State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, 18. On 
appeal the defendant challenged the search of his computer because it not was 
located in the basement portion of the home, but instead was found on the 
upstairs landing portion of his apartment, and therefore was not within the scope 
of the warrant. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, ,I23. 
The court of appeals found the that when the police decided to search the 
landing portion of the apartment they were not involved in the "general, 
6 
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exploratory search against which the particularity requirement was designed to 
(.j protect." Atkin, ,I25. Instead, based on the evidence presented, although the 
landing was not in the basement, "it is [] clear that the house was divided in such 
a manner so as to render that landing part of the basement apartment." Atkin, 
,I25. In other words, "given the nature of the division between the two 
apartments," the warrant that explicitly authorized the search of the basement 
apartment, implicitly authorized the search of the whole residence, including the 
landing. 
But there is good reason to distinguish between stretching the specific 
language of the warrant in Atkin, and stretching the specific language in this case. 
There is nothing about the language of the warrant in this case that implicitly 
authorized the police to go after Binks when he left the location prior to the 
execution of the warrant. Nothing about the nature of the place to be searched 
would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that people who were not at the 
apartment during the execution of the warrant could also be searched and seized. 
There was nothing 'on the ground' that made the language of the warrant actually 
mean something other than what it said. Unlike Atkin, the plain language 
limitations of the warrant define the exact limits of the police authority. 
In another relevant case, Gallegos, the defendant challenged the seizure of a 
VCR and video cassette tapes taken from his home during the execution of an 
otherwise unchallenged warrant. The warrant authorized the seizure of "all 
controlled substances and stolen property", and on appeal the defendant claimed 
7 
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the language of the warrant was not specific enough for the Fourth Amendment's 
particularity requirement, especially because the affidavit which described the 
stolen property the police expected to find did not mention the VCR or tapes. 
State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1985). The State circularly argued 
that because the warrant authorized seizure of "stolen property" and the VCR 
turned out to be stolen, then the property was within the scope of the warrant. 
Gallegos, 209-10. 
This Court agreed with the defendant and noted that even where a warrant 
is supported by a properly incorporated affidavit, "the seizure of the VCR and the 
tapes was still not within the scope of the warrant; the affidavit lists only 'lawn 
chairs, electrical wiring, children's swing, etc.' as being stolen property." 
Oallegos, 210. Because the warrant itself described property only in generic 
terms, it was "not favored by the law.'' Gallegos, 209. In other words, if it were 
not for the affidavit that particularly described the stolen property the police had 
probable cause to believe would be found, the warrant's use of the term 'stolen 
property' would not have justified the seizure of any property. 
This Court, in Gallegos, rejected the exact general argument the State wants 
the Court to accept now. The State argues that because the and warrant generally 
supports the idea that the owner of the house was suspected of dealing drugs, and ~ 
because Binks' interaction with the house was indicative of drug activity, the 
explicit language of the warrant, which does not explicitly reach Binks, should be 
ignored in favor of the general theme of the warrant because the police could 
8 
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reasonably interpret the search warrant's terms to include people like Binks who 
(@ turned out to have drugs on him. In Gallegos the VCR was unknown to the police 
or the issuing judge at the time the warrant was requested and approved, and not 
particularly described therein, nor could the language of the warrant be 
reasonably stretched to reach it. Similarly, Binks was not known to the police who 
were investigating Perez, nor was he particularly described by the warrant. The 
~ language of the warrant which explicitly did not reach him, cannot now be 
stretched ex post facto to include him. 
<.1il> 
This Court should reject the State's flawed argument. The scope of the 
warrant in Gallegos extended exactly to the reasonable limits of the language 
used by the issuing magistrate incorporating the affidavit; to the property which 
the police had reason to believe was stolen. So too here, the scope of the warrant 
extends exactly to the reasonable limits of the language used by Judge Brady, the 
police were authorized only to search "any other person at the location or 
attempting to leave the location at the time of the warrant service" and "[a]ny 
vehicle parked at the location or attempting to leave the location during the time 
of service." Exhibit 4 (emphasis added). There was no reality on the scene, as 
there was in Atkin, that makes the temporal limitation in the warrant flexible. 
And just like Gallegos, when the police found additional property /persons they 
wanted to search and seized, because they were not authorized beforehand the 
cannot get authority from the warrant after-the-fact. Nothing about this case 
should lead this Court to find that what the issuing magistrate intended to do was 
9 
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find probable cause to seize and search other persons who were at the location 
prior to the time the warrant service. 
It is important to remember that the trial court's factual findings are clear, 
the "officers entered to execute the search warrant" "about a minute after the 
defendant and the other man left the residence." R.501. 1 According the trial 
court's findings, "at the time of warrant service" Binks was not "at the location or 
attempting to leave the location". Exhibit 4. The court was equally clear when it 
found "that the search of the residence began immediately after the car left." 
R.438. According to the trial court's findings, which are not clearly erroneous, 
"during the time of service" Binks' vehicle was not "parked at the location or 
attempting to leave the location", the car had already left. Exhibit 4. 
Binks pleads with the Court not to indulge any attempt by the State to divert 
its attention from the basic uncontroverted facts. The trial court's findings, which 
are not challenged by either party on appeal, are clear and ultimately 
determinative to the legal issue. These facts must not be disturbed, avoided, or 
ignored. The trial court found "that the search of the residence began 
immediately after the car left." R-438 (emphasis added). 'After' is not reasonably 
interpreted as equivalent to "at the time" or "during the time". 
The State also wants to distinguish the very relevant holding in United 
1 See Appellant's Replacement Brief at 15-18. Specifically note Adamson's 
testimony: "From the time that you observed the vehicle leaving the parking lot in 
the high density unit to the time that you served the warrant, how much time 
elapsed?" R.092. Adamson replied: "It was maybe about a minute or two." R.092. 
10 
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States v. Brodie, 742 F.3d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2014) by emphasizing that the court 
@ there mentioned it was unclear how much longer the search team intended to 
wait before they were actually going to execute the warrant. See State's Brief at 
24-26. According to this logic, the problem for the government in Brodie was 
only that the officers there were still waiting on several other members of the 
search team when they stopped the defendant. The State wants this Court to be 
tS persuaded by the fact that the officers in this case only waited a minute or two 
after Binks left the scene to execute the warrant, instead of some unknown time 
like in Brodie, because "the Brodie court had no assurance that when the officers 
stopped Brodie, the warrant would be executed any time soon." State's 
Replacement Brief at 25 (emphasis added). In other words, according to the 
State, it must have been the unknown additional delay that put the Brodie 
challenge over the top. 
The State's argument depends on the assumption that if the government in 
Brodie had shown that those other officers showed up only a minute or two later 
and then executed the warrant, then the seizure would have been constitutional, 
(@ 
and the 'when' component would be satisfied. But this position completely 
ignores the operative sentence in the paragraph. "The officers did not encounter 
vii Brodie 'when' a search was underway, even if we imagine a search to be in 
progress from the minute officers start to advance from car or sidewalk to front 
door." Brodie, 1062 (emphasis added). Even if searching had begun immediately 
after the police seized the nearby defendant, that search would not have occurred 
11 
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"at the moment the police officers executed the search warrant." Brodie, 106 
(citing Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 185 L.Ed.2d 19). 'At the ~ 
moment' means exactly what it says. The Court in Bailey, and the court in Brodie, 
each understood that timing is crucial. In this case, according to the language of 
the warrant, timing is everything. 
As much as the State wants to avoid the timing issue, the plain language of 
the warrant, which is the explicit limitation upon the police's authority, makes 
when Binks was seized crucial. There is no doubt, Binks was not seized "at the 
location or attempting to leave the location at the time of warrant service", nor 
was his "vehicle parked at the location or attempting to leave the location during 
the time of service." State's Exhibit 4 (emphasis added). Given these 
unchallenged facts, the State has not provided any convincing reason for this 
Court to stretch the specific timing language of the warrant to consume Binks or 
his vehicle. The State's assurance that such a stretch will not have a deleterious 
effect upon the particularity requirement of the constitution is unpersuasive and 
defies the straightforward language of Bailey and Brodie. 
The State is wrong, the warrant cannot be reasonably be read to include 
authorization to seize and then search someone who was not at the location at the 
time the warrant was served. As Judge Laycock explicitly found, Binks was not at ~ 
the location at the time the warrant was served. 
B. Bailey applies to this case, and according to the factors Binks was not 
in the immediate vicinity 
The State makes a new argument to this Court, one that was not made to 
12 
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the trial court, nor to the Court of Appeals in its initial briefing. Now that the case 
~ has been certified for transfer to this Court, the State claims that the warrant is 
distinct from the warrant at issue in Bailey, and other immediate vicinity cases, 
because those warrants did not specifically apply to the persons who were seized 
~ 
and searched after they left. According to the State, the warrant in this case 
substantially applied to Binks because this warrant covered all persons present 
(;j and he was at the scene just before the warrant was executed. See State's 
Replacement Brief at 20-30. Binks claims this new distinction is not worth 
investigating because he maintains, as argued above, he was not covered by the 
warrant in this case. So even if the new argument the State has now raised is 
correct, and none of the defendants in these immediate vicinity cases were 
covered by a search warrant, Binks is just like the people being seized and 
searched in these other cases because he, just like they, was not covered by the 
warrant when he was seized and searched. 
~ 
But even if this argument has enough merit to be considered, it fails when 
compared to the facts of Bailey. The State claims the defendant in Bailey was 
"not subject to a search warrant" in the same way that Binks was, and therefore 
Bailey is inapplic~ble. See State's Replacement Brief at 22-23. Binks replies that 
this asserted distinction is not supported by the facts of the cases. Although the 
Supreme Court did not focus on the language of the warrant in Bailey, because 
that was not the issue raised, now that the State has raised this distinction, the 
language of the warrant in Bailey is relevant and should be examined. 
13 
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The language of the warrant in Bailey is more completely discussed in the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision at United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197 
(2011). There the court described the warrant as particularly authorizing the 
search of a basement apartment at a specific address "'believed to be occupied by 
an individual known as 'Polo', a heavy set black male with short hair' and 
identified a 'chrome .380 handgun' as the principal target of the search." Bailey, 
652 F.3d 197, 200 (emphasis added). During surveillance, prior to execution of 
the warrant, the police observed the defendant and another man, both of whom 
matched Polo's description, exit the premises. When the defendant was stopped 
"he identified himself and said he was coming from his home at" the address 
listed in the search warrant. See Bailey, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1036. Why the State 
would assert that the defendant in Bailey was not the subject of the warrant, 
when he was specifically described therein, and Binks was the subject of the 
warrant, when he was not described at all, is confusing. ~ 
Another relevant point omitted in the State's brief is the fact that the trial 
court's decision was based upon Bailey. The State criticizes Binks for referring to 
Bailey but ignores the history of this case. It is as if, according to the State, even 
though the trial court's "Findings of Law" were explicitly "[g]uided by Bailey", 
and the court concluded that Binks' "vehicle and its occupants were therefore (f; 
within the 'spatial constraint' authorized by the Supreme Court in Bailey", Binks 
should not now analyze Bailey in his appeal from the trial court's decision. 
R.503-04. This criticism is strange. It is even more strange when the Court of 
14 
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Appeals' certification order is reviewed. There the Court of Appeals determined 
@ that this Court should settle the "important question of law... related to the 
application of Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013), including the scope 
of police officers' authority under an 'all persons and vehicles present' residential 
search warrant to detain and search individuals who have driven from the 
premises just before service of the warrant." Clearly, application of the Bailey 
~ analysis to these facts is central to the question presented in this appeal. 
(@ 
Because Binks was not at the location at the time of the warrant service or 
attempting to leave during the time of the service, the Bailey immediate vicinity 
test is the only means by which the police could have tried to justify detention of 
Binks away from the house. However, as explained in Binks' replacement brief, 
the Bailey factors all suggest the police were not permitted to seize or search 
Binks based on his relationship to the location of the search. See Appellant's 
Replacement Brief at 24-27 (Binks was not seized within the legal limits of the 
property, Binks was not stopped within the line of sight of the premises, and 
Binks' location did not support an easy reentry to the premises). These factors 
undoubtedly support Binks' claim that he was not within the immediate vicinity, 
thus it is not surprising that the State has now changed its tactics before this 
~ Court. Fortunately for Binks, that new tactic depends upon this Court reading 
some very strange inferences, inferences not associated with common sense, into 
the language of the warrant. 
15 
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IL THE POLICE ILLEGALLY EXTENDED THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
Because Binks' detention and search were not authorized by the search 
warrant the question becomes whether there are other justifications to detain and 
ultimately search Binks. The State's argument on this point does not require 
much response. The State acknowledges that Sgt. Jones finished investigating the 
possibility that Binks was under the influence of drugs by 8:19 p.m. and that 
Binks was then searched at 8:25 p.m. State's Brief at 32. The question is what 
justified the continued detention, and the State can only point to the "totality of 
the circumstances." Binks maintains that this is an insufficient response. 
As explained in his replacement brief, Binks maintains that a review of the 
evidence, including the call logs, the officers' testimony, and the dash cam video, 
shows that the officers were delaying the traffic stop in order to hear back from 
the other officers executing the search warrant. This delay, this extension, was 
unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the language of the warrant did authorize the police to search 
Binks, and because Binks was not within the immediate vicinity of the search, the 
police were not authorized by the existence of the warrant to detain or search 
him. Because the police extended the scope of the traffic stop the evidence 
collected from that search should have been suppressed. Binks asks the Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, reverse his conviction, 
and remand the case for a new trial. 
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